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1. Introduction 
The Industrial Revolution in Europe created an economic growth without precedent 
accompanied by a rise in the internal inequality.
1
 In this context some families managed to 
accumulate fortunes disproportionately big that gave them an enormous political and economic 
power becoming the new economic elite, whose influence has extended in some cases to the 
present.
2
 The role of the elites in the long term evolution of this inequality has been studied 
through different approaches. The institutionalists have remarked that the persistence of 
endowments linked to institutions explain why the inequalities persist, Business History has 
focused in the particular role of family firms and the Top Incomes approach has studied the 
share of the rents that the elites manage to retain.
3
 However relatively few studies focus in the 
internal evolution of elites, its evolution in the long term and its permeability.
 4
 In this sense this 
paper aims to contribute to this debate analyzing for the case of Barcelona, when 19
th’s Century 
economic elites were created, replaced and its grade of mobility. The hypothesis that we defend 
is that the creation of elites is restrained to certain specific moments. 
For doing so, we use the taxes on Real State and over Commercial and Industrial activities to 
map the economic activities of Barcelona in three specific moments: 1853, 1883 and 1919. This 
mapping of the economic activities of the city and the proprieties allow us to identify the 
wealthiest 5% objectively. From this pool of individuals we have chosen the twenty five first 
tax payers for each year and by studying their biographies we have determined for each 
individual when the individuals gain access to the elites and which activity fostered the change.
5
 
The methodology proposed in this paper has the advantage of identifying objectively who the 
elites were in three specific moments, instead of relaying in dictionaries of business men or 
industrialist who can have a bias in their election.
6
  
 
2. Concepts and Sources. 
In first place we have to take into consideration the concepts used in this paper. When we refer 
to elites we are talking basically about those individuals situated in the upper 5% of the tax 
                                                          
1 Allen, RC (2009)  
2 Some examples would be Carnegie, Rockefeller, Vanderbiltfor the EEUU, Rostchildfor the UK, Schlumberger for 
Germany, Agnelli for Italy, Juncadella for Spain.  
3 Atkinson, AB, Picketty, T (2007) for Top Incomes, for business history see Landes, D (2006), for institutionalists 
see Acemoglu, D et al (2008) For a general reflection on the role of billionaires see Delong, B (1998)  
4 One of the few debates can be found in England around the “rags to riches” phenomena. See Foreman-Peck, J; 
Smith, J.A (2004); Nicholas, T (1999); Crouzet F(1985).  
5 For studies of Barcelona’s elites see Vicencs Vives, J (1954), Sola, A (1977, 1995, 2004) and McDonough, G 
(1986). For global vision of Spain economic elites: Cabrera, M; Del Rey (2002) and Zurita, R; Camurri, R eds 
(2008). 
6 For England: Foreman-Peck, J; Smith, J.A (2004); Nicholas, T (1999); Crouzet F (1985). They all use as source 
dictionaries of industrialists and businessmen.  For Spain see Diaz Morala, p (2013) 
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distribution.
 7
 This is of course a simplification as in the 19
th
 century society we found very well 
defined hierarchies depending on richness, kind of capital, how and when was acquired, social 
prominence, geographical origin with several sides depending on politics and business.
8
 With 
that in mind, in this paper we are referring to the economic elites as a single group as the 
objective is to understand its evolution. 
In this paper we use direct taxes over proprieties (Contribución Territorial henceforth CT) and 
industrial and commercial activities (Contribución Industrial henceforth CI) as source for 
mapping the economic activity between 1853 and 1919, pointing objectively the elite’s 
members and tracking its evolution. In this section we analyze the tax system in order to 
understand the information provided in the sources, its limitations, and how we should use it in 
our investigation. 
In Spain during the period of our study, direct taxes were allocated in an up-down model where 
the Central Government fixed the quantity that has to be collected. This amount was divided 
between regions, cities and villages following political criterion.
9
 In big cities such as 
Barcelona, Seville, Valencia and Madrid, the major taxpayers headed commissions that assessed 
real estate and fixed the CT. This assessment of real estate was made taking into consideration 
the rents that generated and if this information was not available used the value of the propriety. 
For the Commercial activities the Guilds and Associations also represented by the major tax 
payers made an estimation of the activity of each economic sector and divided the taxes 
accordingly. Taxes over the manufacturing activities were directly fixed by the Central 
Administration using a flat rate for each type of machine. Notice that not all the activities were 
levied being the main excluded ones: bonds, stock shares, and salaries. Finally it is wieldy know 
that this tax system was subjected to a high degree of tax avoidance and of corruption.
10
 In 
summary during the period studied CI was paid by about 10% of the active population and CT 
was paid only by 12% of the families. Hence the studied 5% of the upper tax payers represented 
around 0.6% of population who paid 30-40% of the direct taxes. 
There were internal incentives to counterbalance this potential unfairness of this tax system and 
ensure a certain balance in the allocation of the duties. In the first place, taxes were low and 
represented a small effort at least for the upper classes. Paying taxes also had individual and 
collective direct benefices. Only payers were able to acquire the right to vote and to become 
candidates in municipal and national elections. Also, at least during the first two decades of our 
study (1850-1860) the quantities that were paid by each of the Guilds and Associations were 
                                                          
7 For a review of different approaches to the elite concept in economy see Brezis E; Temin, P (2007).  
8 Badia, M et al (2010) for an example of networks in Barcelona.  
9 Vallejo et al (1996); Curto-Grau, M; Herranz-Locan; Solé-Olle (2012). 
10 Is wieldy know that the tax revenue system in Spain was a corrupted one. In 1870 the rural tax avoidance for 1858-
1865 was estimated in around 40%. Pons Altes, JM (2008), 9. 
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used to configure the municipal government and the top tax payers were included in the 
Municipal Government. Taxes were also a way of mapping the wealth as the quantity that each 
individual or company paid was published. Hence was a way of tracking the relative importance 
of each other business and therefore a way to credit access. This public exposure also assured a 
certain level of vigilance between the tax payers.
11
 In addition a certain amount of fairness in 
distribution was also guaranteed by the necessity of political equilibrium. Direct taxes (as the 
Contribuciones) fall on the activities of the wealthiest, the indirect taxes (Consumos) fall on the 
poorer. So, the political in charge when allocated the taxes had to consider a balance: If he 
charged too much in the direct taxes he could lose his positions as he was damaging his electors. 
If he charged too much in the indirect taxes he could face an uprising like the one in the 
neighbour city of Lleida in 1865.
12
  
We conclude that the tax system give us inexact information, but definitely was the mechanism 
that the major tax payers used to evaluate the incomes of the tax payers and had incentives to be 
fair. We know the tax system was not proportional to the level of wealth or income, but is 
possible to use it to identify the elites in an objective way and they give us a general vision 
(with nuances) of the economic structure of the city.  
Commercial and industrial taxes, CI, were divided in four great Tarifas that sub-divide in 
hundreds of different sections and many of them changed during the period we studied.
13
 Real 
estate tax payers were listed in the CT by surname detailing the proprieties that each individual 
had.
14
 For taxes paid in 1853, 1868 and 1883 we found 44,500 records of individuals and 
companies from where we extracted the upper 5% (3,087)
15
 and we constructed a data base. We 
have to note that since the beginning of the 20
th
 century we are not able to use the 
Contribuciones as the way of recording taxes changed. Commercial and industrial activities 
began to pay a lump sum and real estate was recorded by building and no longer by individual. 
Hence for 1919 we used the list of highest tax payers that had representation in the City Hall for 
identifying the elites and the information from the Official Chamber of Urban Property for the 
aggregate values.
16
  
We have, however to remark one last limitations imposed by our methodology. We excluded 
the Public Limited Companies because we cannot know how the stock shares changed. But the 
                                                          
11 We have found some correspondence, denouncing individuals that change from one college to another for avoiding 
paying its share of taxes. .Correspondencia Junta de Comercio a las cortes 21-03-1864. CXXXIV 2, 221 Legajo 
CXXXIV. 
12 Pons Altes, JM (2008), 27 
13 In 1853 we find more that 300 categories and in 1883 this number has increased to more than 350 as the most 
relevant activities were subdivided and new ones were included. In 1853 were recorded 8,543 tax payers and in 1883 
11,738. We have picked up 5% of the upper tax payers of each Tarifa in order to have a homogenous sample.  
14 In 1853 we found 5,501 proprietaries and in 1883 7,497.  
15 This number does not correspond with a 5% as we have picked up 5% of each of the Tarifas in order to capture the 
widest number of individuals.  
16 Massana, C (1985). 191-207.  
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diversification of investment of economic elites that is reflected in their inheritances allows us 
to overcome this limitation. For instance, Manel Girona was one of the greatest shareholders of 
the “Banc de Barcelona” a limited company that does not appear, but we can easily find him 
among the top tax payers for the companies he co-owned or for his real estate proprieties.  .  
All in all taxes has allowed to construct a date base that can be used to objectively choose who 
the higher tax payers are in three specific moments, follow the movements of these high 
taxpayers within the elites and compare the evolution of the different groups that compose the 
elites. 
 
3. The elites among the economic structure of Barcelona 
In this section we use our data base to present a first aggregate analysis of the economic 
structure of the city of Barcelona from 1853 to 1919. We use the CI to point in which activities 
we can locate the major tax payers and use the CT to analyze the economic structure of real 
estate and extend the analysis to 1919.  
Industrial and Commercial activities. 
As we have said for industry and Commerce we have available data for 1853 and 1883. During 
these three decades the growth of Barcelona’s population was relatively stable and industrial 
firms still had not moved to the periphery as will do later.
 17
 Annex 1 shows the total numbers of 
tax paying for 1853 and 1883 and the weight of each activity in number of individuals and in 
taxes. Graphs 1 and 2 present the same data in percentages. For instance in 1853 the individuals 
paying taxes in the Commercial activities section represented 33% of the total taxes while 
accounted 80% of the top tax payers. In 1883 represented 23% and accounted little more than 
50% of the upper tax payers. Observing these figures we can extract several conclusions.  
 
                                                          
17 Tatjer Mir, M (2010). 
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Graph 1 and 2. Comparison of the economic structure of Barcelona in 1853 and 1883 using CI. own elaboration. 
The first and more relevant is stability: the upper 5% pays almost the same percentage in 1853 
and in 1883 (35% and 37% respectively) and the most relevant activities are for all the period 
those related with industry, commerce transport and finance. In this activity we identify a core 
of families enriched during the end of the 18
th
 century and the beginning of the 19
th
 that in 1853 
appeared paying mainly under the category of merchants and in 1883 were subdivided in 
merchants, ship-owners and bankers and that with the industrialists comprehend most of the 
elite’s members. The decrease of the taxes paid by this group in 1883 is artificial as is 
consequence of the tax effort reaching other economic flourishing groups such as the liberal 
professionals (lawyers, notaries, doctors…). Another fact that reassures this stability is that 
these elites linked to commerce, decreased their ranks during three decades in little more than 
forty individuals while the base increased in 37%. This stability and concentration of the 
business was consequence of the necessity of adopting economies of scale that needed 
increasing amounts of capital, and as consequence of the absence of boundaries that limited its 
size. 
Secondly, as the top of the pyramid remained stable we observe that the authorities in charge of 
the revenues, the top tax payers, did an effort for increasing the base of tax payers as year after 
year we found an increase in the number of divisions and in the diversification of the taxed 
activities. Of course this also reflects the growth and internationalization of the city and the 
necessity of the Central Government of gathering taxes.  
Thirdly we observe an increase in the differences within the highest tax payers. By way of 
example observe in graph 3. In it we can see the evolution of the number of merchants and 
bankers over time and the taxes paid by each individual. The diminution in the number of 
merchants is parallel to a severe increase in the payments of the top. For instance, in 1853 the 
top 10% paid 3.4 more times that the bottom 10% and there was a difference of 5.2 times 
between the highest and the lowest tax payer in this category. In 1883 the top 10% paid 8.3 
0
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times more than the lowest and the difference between the higher and the lower tax payer has 
increased to 7.3 times.  
This increase in the concentration is also observed among industrial tax payers, as only one 
tenth of the industry is big enough to be present among the upper 5%. This reflects the evolution 
of industry in the city since the beginning of the century: very few big factories and many little 
workshops, which will remain as one of the characteristics of Barcelona's industry during the 
20
th
 century. The increase in this sector is related with a diversification in the activities of the 
factories. In 1853 we found only different textile activities, but in 1883 we begin to find other 
activities as manufactories of machinery, nails, cards, beers, etc. Of course we do not have to 
forget that taxes on industry were fixed by Central Administration as part of the protectionist 
policy. In consequence we may be facing an underrepresentation of the global weight of these 
activities. We have to remember that Barcelona was since 1820's both a very important factory 
core after the industry moved from the interior of Catalonia due to the increase in cost of coal, 
as well as turning into a “logistic hub” as the city exported a big part of his production to the 
rest of Spain and the Settlements and imported the raw materials (coal and cotton) need for their 
industry.
18
  
The distribution of the activities also fits with the information we have from the representation 
in the City Hall. For instance in 1854-56 manufacturers had 9.5% of the aldermen and paid 10% 
of the taxes and merchants had 38% of the representation and paid half of the taxes. 
 
 
Graph 3. Taxes paid by Merchants and Bankers in 1853, 1868 and 1883. Own elaboration 
 
Real Estate owners 
                                                          
18 Nadal, J (1975) 
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The study of taxes over real estate allows us to complement and extend the information 
provided by the Industrial and Commercial taxes, allowing us to study concentration in long 
term. When approaching real estate series we have to take into consideration that we are 
studding the time when Barcelona, as many other European cities, demolish their walls and 
began the construction of the Eixample. A new bourgeoisie space for the upper and middle class 
that wanted to escape from the crowded old town. This process was neither fast nor regular in 
time. On the contrary to other cities the big promoters quickly become bankrupt and the 
expansion of Barcelona rely on in individuals that invested in a small number of proprieties. 
This circumstance gives the study more reliability as the propriety is more dispersed.
19
  
As we have previously mentioned in the case of real estate we are able to expand our series to 
1919 and Graph 4 summarized the evolution of real estate proprieties. As in CI the CT remains 
stable from 1853 to 1883 as percentages of concentration remain almost the same. But with the 
turn of the century we observe a sharp increase in both population and concentration. This 
phenomenon was boosted by the fact that the WWI supposed huge benefices for Barcelona's 
elites. Graph 4 also points that during the second half of the 19
th
 century the number of tax 
payers increases in parallel to the number of elites and slightly less that the population,
20
 but 
during the first twenty years of the 20
th
 century as the city receives immigrants and expands a 
severe increase in both population and concentration is observed. During the period 1853-1919 
while the population of Barcelona multiplies by nearly 4, the owners of buildings multiply by 6, 
but the upper 5% only increase in 1,3 times. In another words by 1919 1,200 families had about 
37% of the proprieties, while 157,000 families had no proprieties.  
This severe increase in the concentration and in consequence in inequality has to be situated in 
the middle of city shaken by a mutual violence between the upper classes and the work class.  It 
helps to understand the climate aggression that transformed Barcelona in a violent city by the 
end of the century.  
                                                          
19 Tafunell, X (1994), Villar, P (2008). 
20 CON/FAM compares families with contributors.  
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Graph 4. Evolution of concentration on Real Estate vs increase of population. Own elaboration 
 
1853 1868 1883 1920 
5 % upper [%] 0,271 0,294 0,286 0,374 
10 % upper [%] 0,402 0,428 0,419 0,581 
5% upper [n] 220 275 375 1302 
10% upper [n] 440 550 749 2604 
Total tax payers 4.395 5.497 7.492 26.044 
Barcelona population [n] 179.755 200.837 268.471 710.335 
Barcelona families [n] 35.951 40.167 53.694 157.852 
 
Table 1.Evolution of concentration on Real Estate. Own elaboration. 
 
4. A prosopographical approach to the elites 
The information presented in the previous section maps the distribution of taxes among the 
different activities and presents an aggregate picture of the evolution of income concentration in 
Barcelona. In this section we use the same data base to identify the major tax payers tracking 
their evolution in time.  
We have picked up from the 5% 125 top tax payers distributed as follows: the 25 top tax payers 
for 1853 and 1883 for from CT and CI and the 25 first real estate owners for 1919. These 125 
individuals have been grouped into 81 families that are defined as our case studies. This 
grouping has been done through the observation of direct linkages between individuals (i.e. 
father-son, uncle-nephew or when we detect a direct transmission of the inheritance). As we 
move forwards and backwards in time this simple methodology becomes increasingly 
complicated as the number of antecessors and descendants increase. When having to choose 
between family branches we have selected the line where the main part of the capital was 
transmitted or originated. The methodology also has the limitation that we did only record the 
origin of the fortune and not the successive dedications that its members have or the ways in 
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which they invest their capital over time. For instance the members of the family Bacardi appear 
recurrently in our date base. They gathered their initial fortune after the War of the Spanish 
Succession (1701-1714) through an asiento of bread (kind of public tender). Her son and 
grandson invested in real estate and his grand grandson invested in different public limited 
societies and was the representative of the Central Bank of Spain in Barcelona appearing as a 
one of the first tax payers in 1853 and his son in 1883 and 1919. But following our methodology 
its case of study appears as a fortune created in early XVIII century through commerce.  
Having in mind this limitations we have made an in-deep analysis of their biographies and 
background extracting the following systematic information: age, place of birth, when they 
become part of the elites, how they became part of the elites detailing the economic activity 
which gave origin of the fortune and their involvement in politics. From our list we have deleted 
public limited companies and for the limited partnership companies we have used the most 
important shareholder. We have analyzed jointly those paying taxes for real estate and for 
commerce as we have observed from the available last wills that the observed individuals 
formed a single group with similar backgrounds. 
In first place we focus in the origins of the 81 cases. Graph 5 and table 2 shows the origins for 
each member that appears in each year. As we are looking to the top tax payers of each year 
some individuals or their descendants may repeat. This approach is useful to observe that during 
the second half of the 18
th
 century and the first decades of the 19
th
 is a concentration of cases 
independent of the year. In other words: individuals appearing in 1853, 1883 and 1919 
accumulated capital broadly in the same period. This assumption is based in a second 
observation, that when top tax payers disappear from our lists of 25 major tax payers they do 
not drop off from elites. In fact we are observing an internal replacement with very little 
mobility from outsiders between 1853 and 1919. This internal mobility can be observed in table 
2 in the progressive replacement of the merchants and rentiers by industrials. After WWI 
families linked with Antilles, Commerce and the old aristocracy fade in front of the owners of 
factories. This increase is caused by the decision of the members belonging to the second or 
third generation of manufacturers from the hinterland and the surrounding bell of the city to 
install in downtown and of course due to the increasing importance of the industrial sector 
during the end of the 19
th
 century. The old families coming from the 18
th
 century gradually drop 
off either as they become related with larger families in Spain or due to a progressive loss of 
importance. The opportunities to enrich in Cuba and Puerto Rico progressively close as 
increases emigration and insecurity in the colonies. Those families with fortunes originated in 
Antilles and through commerce fade away remaining only the really big ones, like Claudio 
12 
 
Lopez Bru whose father created the largest shipping company in Spain.
21
 Manufacturers replace 
the old bankers and merchants as first tax payers.  
 
Graph 5. Origin and activity for each of the samples. 
origin 1853 1883 1919 
Antilles 9    0,23    10    0,36    3 0,15 
industry 9    0,23    7    0,25    11 0,55 
merchants 15    0,38    8    0,29    5 0,25 
rentiers 6    0,15    3    0,11    1 0,05 
total 39   28   20   
 
 Table 2. Activity of top tax payers by year of observation  
In order to have a more precise vision of where the windows of opportunity were situated in 
table 3 and graph 6 we have grouped the individuals in cases of study, independently of the year 
and the number of times that appear. This way of organizing the data allows us to reconstruct in 
the long term the evolution of elites.  
The six of them that have their origins in the 17
th
 century or before are families from the 
Catalonian or Castellan aristocracy. Two of them are absentees whose main proprieties are in 
other parts of Spain. The other four are families of the old aristocracy that had a prominent role 
in the institutions of Barcelona before to the War of Succession. During the war they fought in 
different sides, gathering honors and proprieties. And by the middle of the 18
th
 century their 
patrimonial situation had increased through marriages, allowing them to remain part of the elites 
during the 19
th
 and in some cases 20
th
 centuries.
22
 
During the first half of the 18
th
 century after the defeat of the Habsburg forces and the 
imposition in Catalonia of a new political and economic regime, the old political elite 
                                                          
21 Rodrigo Alharilla, M (2000) 
22 Fontana, J (2014), Garcia Espuche (2014). 
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disappeared. And although there are no specific studies that cover the evolution of the economic 
elite during the 18
th
 century from the available biographies we can conclude that the 17
th
 century 
economic elite, mainly formed by merchants, continued during the 18
th
 century.
23
  
The first years after the war was a period of reconstruction of the economic activity heavily 
conditioned by the war consequences and we only record two cases of economic promotion. 
The Canals family, linked with the first factory of calicos and the Bacardi family, merchants 
that obtained several public procurements (asientos) and that were able to successfully invest in 
real estate. In both cases branches of those families still were relevant in the 20
th
 Century. The 
fact that we are only able to observe two cases reinforces our hypothesis that there was no 
replacement in the economic elites after the war.  
The 18
th
 century merchants, survivors of the 17
th
 century, followed a model of commercial 
business strongly linked with the Ancient Regime logic, were the ultimate objective was to 
gather enough capital and influence to win access to the aristocracy. But, in the periphery of 
their supply chains and in the new manufacturing activities we detect the creation of new 
fortunes with a different mentality. 
During the second half of the century due to the reforms carried out by the House of Bourbon 
(that basically allowed Catalonia and other regions to trade with the colonies without the 
restrictive laws of the flotas and some incentives to the manufactures and to commerce in 
general), a loss of influence from the guilds, a very favorable international scenario and a 
hinterland that produced wine products that could be exchanged, the opportunities boosted, 
especially for those situated in the right networks.
24
 Among them we find the first indianos still 
linked with the continental colonies of South America, manufacturers of calicos and merchants 
from the hinterland that were either settling in Barcelona or establishing their first connections 
with Cuba. A colony that still had not achieved the importance that will have decades later.  
Most of these individuals had a (relatively) wealthy background or a solid technical background 
as part of the guilds that enabled them to take advantage of the opportunities. Although, almost 
none of them were able to demonstrate that had the rents to become part of the Junta de 
Comercio that grouped the main merchants of the city. But when the Napoleonic wars and the 
Independence of the Colonies hit the city and turned up-down the equilibrium of forces in the 
commercial sector and industry took a new and leading role being able to take advantage of the 
situation. If we just compare the surnames of the members of the Junta before and after the war 
we find that they have changed almost completely. 
                                                          
23 Garcia Espuche, A (2014). 
24 Torras i Elias (1994), Vilar P (1964). 
14 
 
Why? The explanation is linked to the relationship between industry and commerce. Before the 
war manufacturers depended of merchants. The Junta members controlled the access to the 
markets and in some ways the access to informal credit. But by the 20's the manufacturers had 
the most prominent role as they had been able to change their industry and began to 
manufacture cotton changing the supply lines, the product that was offered and the financial 
services that the merchants had to offer. 
25
 This change was already pointed out by Jaume 
Vicencs Vives and Angels Solà, when they describe how after the Napoleonic Wars a 
generation of new men took the economic reins of the city. In this paper we have confirmed this 
affirmation as we can see that a great window of opportunity opened just after 1808 and began 
to close between 1840 and 1860. These 60 years concentrate 62% of the creation of great 
fortunes. Opportunities appeared in the Antilles, either through commerce or by the direct 
exploitation of business in the settlements. And in some specific manufacturing or commercial 
ventures, most of them linked with individuals or companies already economically prosperous 
who successfully adapt.  
period origin cases percentage 
XVII rentiers 6 0,11 
1st half XVIII 
industry 1 
0,04 
merchants 1 
2nd half 
XVIII 
Antilles 1 
0,20 industry 6 
merchants 4 
1800-1840 
Antilles 11 
0,45 industry 6 
merchants 8 
1840-1860 
Antilles 3 
0,16 
industry 3 
merchants 2 
rentiers 1 
1860-1900 
Antilles 1 
0,05 industry 1 
merchants 1 
 
Table 3.origin and period of formation of the elites. 
                                                          
25 Fradera, J (1987) 
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Graph 6. Origin and period of formation of the elites. 
Those from the Antilles and specifically Cuba were the most numerous group in 1800-1860 
counting 14 individuals. We have to take into consideration that the Antilles was a very 
particular place during the first decades of the 19
th
 century. It was one of the places in America 
with highest GDP and per capita income due to the sugar commerce, whose importance was 
boosted due to withdraw of Haiti from commerce.
26
 Catalonian merchants (and people from all 
over Spain) participated in different aspects from the triangular commerce that exported wine 
and manufactures from Catalonia in exchange of sugar from Cuba and cotton form New 
Orleans. Strongly linked to the slavery in a time when the United Kingdom banned its 
commerce. 
27
  
The process was gradual and most of them began as part of small business that progressively 
grew along with the economy of the island. The initial networks were quite small and in fact the 
most important ones were the ones that linked Barcelona with South America. But after the loss 
of the colonies and the importance that Cuba acquired both as hub for the cotton and as origin 
for the sugar this networks increase in importance. The individuals that compose these networks 
stay in charge for decades sending the benefices to Spain and returning to their hometowns after 
a time. This immigration remained linked to Catalonia and offered the possibility to young men 
to jump to the Antilles with a certain security. Newcomers from Catalonia or from other parts of 
Spain where able to integrate in these established circles and some of them thrive. In return, a 
apart from the capital, the indianos also returned with an increased human capital.  
Indianos had a diverse behavior after their return and their assets, as can see from the last wills 
that are available tend to diverse in their investments. But in our case studies almost two-thirds 
appear as important proprietary and the rest where merchants or in two cases factory owners. 
                                                          
26 Coatsworth, J (1999). Bahamonde, A; Cayuela, J (1992). 
27 Moreno Freginals, M (2001); Rodrigo Alharilla, M (1998, 2007, 2014); Yañez, C (2008) 
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We have to consider that observing the taxes paid in the city of Barcelona only show part of the 
picture.
28
  
Those linked with commerce and manufacturing had a pattern very similar to that found in the 
second half of the XVIII Century: members of guilds whose activities had a high market value, 
merchants and manufacturers from the hinterland that moved to the city either as agents of their 
families or to begin a new business. Examples illustrate these backgrounds. For instance we find 
the members of the Girona family whose founder Ignasi Girona departed from a wealthy 
position at the end of the 18th century and was able to create a Merchant House that his sons 
would expand becoming of the axis of Barcelona during the 19
th
 century. Manel Girona and his 
brothers created the most important bank of the city and a holding of several dozens of 
companies in different sectors.
29
 Francisco Fontanellas a merchant from a wealthy family that 
through the asientos was able to get access to enough credit to become involved in the financial 
business. Antonio Xuringuer a merchant related with the trade of products. And two Italians 
merchants linked with networks from their hometowns that although had arrived to the city 
during the 18
th
 century did not had the chance to accumulate capital until the first decades of the 
19
th
 century. Antonio Durio invested in the business of restoration and Ignazio Villavechia 
being involved in the commerce of grain. Both maintained a prominent position during the 19
th
 
century and both maintained strong links with their hometowns generation after generation. 
Almost all of them by the mid of the XIX century were investing heavily in real estate, and 
almost all of their descendants appear in 1883 or 1919 as big real estate owners.  
But commerce as way of boosting solid and long term fortunes very soon reached a dead-end. 
Between 1840 and 1900 we only found three cases of economic progress. The family Vidal-
Ribas linked with the powerful commercial house of the Nadal whose origins seem to be related 
with slave trade. And Salvador Andreu, a pharmacist who managed to create a new model of 
retail business and that managed to direct a huge investment in urbanizing the mountain of 
Tibidabo and lastly the local agent of the Galician bank house Simeon Garcia. Of course this 
does not mean that no commercial or financial initiatives were launched. What does it meant is 
that opportunities either was taken by members of the consolidated elites or that did not 
generate capital able to survive in the long term.   
In reference to industrials, we find families that have their origins in the manufacturing 
companies created during the 18
th
 century coming from either technicians related with the calico 
industry that in most cases finally owned their business, merchants who invested in this sector 
or foreign technicians. For instance we find a French technician named Jean Achon that through 
technical improvement was able to establish a calico printing factory whose sons continued. 
                                                          
28 Rodrigo Alharilla, M (2007) 
29 Blasco, Y; Sudria, C (2009), Pla Tolrà, L (2014) 
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Francisco Juan Siataré a ship builder from a guild origin that invested the benefits in real estate. 
The Batlló a family of manufacturers that just in one generation passed from owning several 
workshops to one of the largest factories in Barcelona. And the Pons family silk merchants’ that 
invested in a network of factories that lasted for more than one century. During the last decades 
of the century we observe that the second generation of industrialist that had constructed their 
factories outside Barcelona moved to downtown either because they favored living in the city or 
because they invested in the town. And that the new entries are related to factories no longer 
linked with textile, like Jose Mansana one of the few self-made man that we find which was 
related with the gas industry, Josep Pujol a bourgeois that in partnership with French 
industrialists constructed an important brick factory. 
In consequence after 1860 the upper part of the elites closed upon themselves, which coincides 
with the literature of the time. Before the windows of opportunity were linked to specific 
external shocks. In the review we have identified the War of Succession, the Napoleonic Wars, 
the loss of the continental settlements and the Industrial Revolution. These shocks impacted in 
the elites and fostered deep changes. But after 1860 the economic crisis of 1864-68, the end of 
the febre d’or in 1882 and the loss of the settlements in 1898 did not produced a substitution in 
the elites. My hypothesis is that there is no change since 1860 as the nature of the crisis changed 
and the opportunities associated with the technological changes of the industrial revolution were 
mainly seized by the elites, with very little opportunities for outsiders.  
Regarding the change in the nature of the crisis, the War of Succession and the Napoleonic 
Wars impacted heavily in the city. The first killed thousands of inhabitants forced to exile 
dozens of thousands and destroyed a fifth part of the city and banned the institution of 
Catalonia. The second was accompanied by years of French occupation and by the exile of most 
of the elites from the city. These violent impacts along with a technical change and a deep 
change in the markets produced the replacement of elites. But during the second half of the 19
th
 
century, although several uprisings, and three civil wars there was little intense violence within 
the city. And the elite members had the capital and knowledge to invest and to take advantage of 
the technical changes.  
This progressive closure among the ranks of the elite is also reflected in the increasing age of 
the elite members and in the progressive drop-off from the direct implication in policy. While in 
1808 the average age was around 40 years for the Junta members, in 1853 the top tax payers 
had increased the average age to 53 years and in 1919 it has raised to 61 years. This tendency 
was also pointed by Pickety et al (2006) for the same period in Paris. Part of this increase of 
course is associated with a general extension of the life expectancy but also to a general aging in 
elites due to the absence of new members.  
18 
 
Regarding their direct involvement in politics we have to remember that almost all the members 
were de facto actively involved due to their obligations as top tax payers or as active 
memberships of the different patronal lobbies. And most of them had a place in the Municipal 
Board and in different committees. But there is a progressive difference in the involvement and 
in the positions defended. While in the beginning of the 19
th
 century we find some of the elite’s 
members with a clear liberal allegiance, taking part in the civil wars and going to exile. In the 
middle of the century they become active parliamentarians and senators defending their 
economic positioning in person either in Madrid’s Parliament or in Barcelona as Majors. But 
while in 1853 and in 1883 the ones who become deputies were individuals who need to have 
direct linkages with the central government in order to protect or promote their business (i.e. 
defend protectionism of the textile industry). These linkages for the generation of 1919 were no 
longer necessary as this influence was set up through other ways. They had the possibility of 
sending representatives to Madrid, to finance the generals that lead the pronunciamientos or 
directly to influence the monarchy following an aggressive policy of ennoblement that was set 
up by the monarchy for having a direct linkage with them.
30
 Among the 1919 200 first tax 
payers we find 25 nobles, most of them of very recent creation. An example of this change can 
be found in the Guell family. Joan Guell i Ferrer was Indiano, manufacturer and one of the most 
influent figures in Barcelona, was deputy in Madrid defending the Catalonian industry. His 
grandson was a personal friend of the Monarch Alfonso XIII and did not needed to be deputy. 
This evolution on the influence marked a rupture in elites since the beginning of the XX century 
among those who remained closely linked to the city and those who jump to a national and even 
in some cases international level.   
 
1853 1883 1919 
deputy 7 3 2 
senator 3 3 
 
major 1 3 
 
 
Table 4. Members of the elites involved in politics. 
 
5. Conclusions. 
The two approaches presented in this paper give a complementary vision of the evolution of 
Barcelona's elites in the long term covering the 18
th
, 19
th
 and 20
th
 century. The aggregate data of 
taxes over commerce and industry are used to map those activities where elites are present. As 
we have seen the analysis demonstrates that commerce, banking and shipping were key 
activities and that most of Barcelona elites were linked to these activities in one way or another. 
This group presented stability over time and implement severe restrictions to access to its ranks, 
                                                          
30
 De Riquer, B (2013) 
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reinforced by a progressive concentration of capital. Industry on the other hand, although clearly 
underrepresented in the tax system had a pyramidal structure with very big factories with high 
permanence over time and little workshops. The importance of industry as a road to elites seems 
to become increasingly important during the second half of the century. Other groups appeared 
as consequence of economic growth and its importance is acknowledged by their incorporation 
into the tax system but do not generate big accumulations of capital. In this context real estate 
was for elites another way of investing in both economic and social capital and a way of 
transferring the capital. The analysis of the long term series of proprieties helps us to understand 
the inequality associated with the evolution of elites.  
We complete this analysis through a prosopographical approach of the principal lineages. 
Through a systematic review we find that continuity is also evident, being the movements 
among the upper 5% common but cases of “rags to riches” very infrequent. The fact that we 
have been able to track that certain lineages have maintained their presence among the 
economic elites since the 18
th
 until today, highlights the importance of studding the initial 
accumulation of capital.  
Biographies also help to obtain information that is clearly unavailable through an aggregate 
analysis. In the first place we are able to situate the origin of the fortunes and the windows of 
opportunity. In this we have concluded that the Antilles during the first half of the 19
th
 century 
was an exceptional place for promotion either through the effort of generations or by some other 
ways, whose impact still is matter of controversy. Also, commerce and industry was a way for 
families very close in an economic sense to elites, to enrich and establish trade houses and 
factories that would become key actors in the life of the city. But after the decade of 1860's the 
entries of new members diminish and opportunities seem to be captured by elite’s members. 
After the impacts of the Napoleonic Wars and the Industrial Revolution it becomes extremely 
difficult to reach the top, and for those that had already reach it took (generally) decades to step 
down. The descent from this category could take generations and was generally associated to a 
dispersion of fortunes among heirs accounting very little cases of bankruptcy. This lack of 
renewal is reflected in the increasing age of the members of the elite and how they become less 
interested in a direct involvement in politics.  
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Annex 1 
 
1853 1883 
 
tax payers 
[individuals] 
upper 5% 
[individuals] 
Total 
Taxes 
taxes paid by 
upper 5% 
tax payers 
[individuals] 
upper 5% 
[individuals] 
Total 
Taxes 
taxes paid by 
upper 5% 
Other commercial services 6312 12 494.546 10.760 4293 8 813.808 8.488 
Commercial Activities 605 417 400.087 335.363 370 284 747.644 671.809 
Bankers 5 0 3.432 0 130 56 171.304 120.300 
Transport 0 0 0 0 148 25 96.609 54.193 
Liberal professions 333 14 72.687 9.010 1283 125 426.171 110.226 
Manufacturing and Industry 967 48 123.219 44.549 1387 77 396.701 150.438 
Other professions 0 0 0 0 3173 103 364.750 45.306 
Retailers and small commerce 81 9 29.672 5.932 503 61 178.147 60.499 
Recreational Activities (Cafes, 
Restaurants, Theatres) 
192 20 64.437 19.402 117 9 56.936 13.162 
Managers 0 0 0 0 256 2 26.891 2.814 
Newspapers and printers. 46 4 13.219 3.531 78 0 7.356 0 
Total  8543 524 1.210.341 428.547 11738 750 3.286.317 1.237.235 
         Other commercial services 0,74  0,02  0,41  0,03  0,37  0,01  0,25  0,01  
Commercial Activities 0,07  0,80  0,33  0,78  0,03  0,38  0,23  0,54  
Liberal professions 0,04  0,03  0,06  0,02  0,11  0,17  0,13  0,09  
Manufacturing and Industry 0,11  0,09  0,10  0,10  0,12  0,10  0,12  0,12  
Other professions 0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,27  0,14  0,11  0,04  
Retailers and small commerce 0,01  0,02  0,02  0,01  0,04  0,08  0,05  0,05  
Bankers 0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,01  0,07  0,05  0,10  
Transport 0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,01  0,03  0,03  0,04  
Recreational Activities (Cafes, 
Restaurants, Theatres) 
0,02  0,04  0,05  0,05  0,01  0,01  0,02  0,01  
Managers 0,00  0,00  0,00  0,00  0,02  0,00  0,01  0,00  
Newspapers and printers. 0,01  0,01  0,01  0,01  0,01  0,00  0,00  0,00  
Total  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 
